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Britain, ‘Brexit’ and the Balkans 
 
James Ker-Lindsay 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article assesses the ways in which a British decision to leave the European Union 
(Brexit) would affects the United Kingdom’s relationship with the Western Balkans. 
In the first instance, it shows that it would almost certainly reduce its influence over 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to shape the process of engagement between 
Serbia and Kosovo. At the same time, the UK would find that it would gain no 
material advantage in terms of its ability to handles other regional issues that may 
have a direct or indirect effect on Britain, such as illegal migration and the flow of 
fighters from the Balkans into Syria. Meanwhile, other forms of influence, such as the 
United Kingdom’s major role in NATO or its permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council, would be diminished as a result of a ‘Brexit’. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The prospect of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union has opened up 
discussions on the possible implications that this will have on British foreign and 
security policy. One area where the effects of a decision to leave the European Union 
would be keenly felt is the Western Balkans. Over the past two decades, the United 
Kingdom has been at the very forefront of efforts to stabilise the region, particularly 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. This has brought considerable successes. 
However, the task is far from complete. There is still a very real risk of a return of 
tensions and conflict. As will be seen, the main safeguard against this is now the lure 
of EU membership. In this context, a very real question emerges as to how a decision 
to leave the EU might affect Britain’s continued influence in the region? Likewise, 
there are a number of issues of concern in Balkans that affect the UK, either directly 
or indirectly. These include illegal migration and tackling the flow of foreign fighters 
to Syria. Once again, how would a decision to exit the EU affect Britain’s control 
over these issues? This article examines Britain’s relationship with the Western 
Balkans and seeks to assess just how much a Brexit, should it come to pass, would 
affect the UK’s standing the region and whether other forms of influence could 
mitigate the effects of a British withdrawal from the EU. 
 
 
Managing the Post-Conflict Environment 
 
Peace and security in the Balkans remains a key foreign policy objective for Britain. 
As the Foreign Office noted as recently as May 2015, 
 
Stability in the Western Balkans matters; the region is on Europe’s doorstep 
and instability or conflict would affect the UK, including through migration 
and organised crime. The UK is therefore working to reduce the risk of 
conflict in the region, promote stability and reconciliation, and support 
reforms, as the region moves towards future EU and NATO membership.
i
 
 
Since the middle of the 1990s, the United Kingdom has played an important role in 
stabilising and securing the Western Balkans following the end of the Yugoslav wars. 
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Britain not only contributed troops to the 
NATO and then EU-led post-conflict peacekeeping missions, it also took an active 
role in the civilian leadership of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Even 
now, Paddy Ashdown is still widely seen as the most influential of all the 
international figures tasked with the role of overseeing the country’s implementation 
of the Dayton Accords, the agreement that brought the war to an end. As High 
Representative from May 2002 until January 2006, he was widely credited – though 
not without controversy and criticism
ii
 – with taking a particularly robust approach 
towards elements within the state that threatened to undermine peace and stability.
iii
 
 
More recently, the United Kingdom has continued to pay considerable attention to the 
fragile political situation in Bosnia. William Hague, during his term as Foreign 
Secretary, took a particularly active interest in the country. This has continued after 
his departure, in July 2014. Most recently, and following a series of failed efforts by 
the European Union to bring about vitally necessary constitutional reform,
iv
 the UK 
joined Germany in drawing up a set of proposals that have now put debate on 
constitutional change to one side for the meanwhile in the hope that greater attention 
can be focused on securing meaningful economic and social reform and development 
that would enhance the country’s EU accession prospects.v These proposals have now 
been adopted by the European Union.
vi
 
 
Likewise, Kosovo also represents another very important example of how Britain has 
been at the forefront of efforts to secure regional peace and stability. In 1999, the UK 
took the lead in building up international support for efforts to tackle the deteriorating 
conflict in the then Serbian province. This led to a seventy-eight-day NATO air 
campaign that saw Serbian forces ousted from Kosovo and a UN administration put in 
place. Moreover, at the start of the process to determine Kosovo’s final status, which 
began under UN auspices in late 2005, it was the United Kingdom that was the first 
country to openly state that the eventual outcome would be full independence.
vii
 
 
Even after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, in February 2008, the UK 
continued to play a pivotal role in Kosovo. Along with the US and France, it was at 
the forefront of efforts to secure widespread recognition of Kosovo’s statehood.viii As 
a result, Kosovo is now recognised by over 100 members of the United Nations and 
has succeeded in joining a range of international organisations, including the IMF, 
World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
the International Olympic Committee. At the same time, the UK, albeit indirectly, has 
also had an inordinately strong role in efforts to bring about a normalisation of 
relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU-led dialogue between Belgrade and 
Pristina, which began in March 2011, was initially led by Sir Robert Cooper, before 
being handled directly by Baroness Ashton.
ix
 In addition, Britain has been, along with 
Germany, at the forefront of efforts to stress to Serbia that its path towards EU 
accession will continue to be conditioned on its ongoing willingness to engage with 
Pristina.
x
 As a result, agreements have now been reached between the two sides on a 
host of key issues, including the status of the Serbian population in Kosovo, Kosovo’s 
participation in regional initiatives and the opening up of bilateral trade. 
 
As Bosnia and Kosovo have both shown, Britain has been a major factor in securing 
and stabilising the Western Balkans for the past twenty years. And yet, in both cases, 
that influence has become increasingly interlinked with the UK’s place within the 
European Union. In both instances, it is now the lure of EU membership, more than 
anything else, which serves to underpin British efforts to build stability and foster 
further reconciliation. By committing the countries of the region to peaceful 
neighbourly relations, the European Union provides the crucial rationale for them to 
moderate their positions towards one another and has opened the way for the peace 
and stabilisation initiatives outlined above. Such efforts have also been enhanced by 
the fact that across the region EU membership remains a popular goal amongst the 
public at large. Even in the most Eurosceptic country in the region, Serbia, a recent 
opinion poll shows support for EU membership at 59 per cent.
xi
 
 
In this context, it needs to be recognised that it is Britain’s place as a senior partner in 
the EU that now gives London a powerful voice to affect change in the Western 
Balkans. In the case of Bosnia, it is hard enough for the European Union to bend local 
leaders to its will in the current environment. It is all but impossible to see how the 
UK, acting outside of the EU, could possibly hope to exert any meaningful influence 
over the local parties. Similarly, in the case of Kosovo, Britain would find that its 
standing in the broader scope of the problem would be greatly diminished if it were to 
leave the EU. To be sure, it seems likely that it would retain a degree of leverage over 
Pristina by virtue of its vital support for Kosovo’s independence. However, even this 
cannot be taken for granted should Britain leave the EU.
xii
 Meanwhile, almost all 
influence that Britain may have in Serbia would certainly be lost under such 
circumstances. It is the pull of EU accession that has done more than anything to 
transform the way in which Belgrade engages with Kosovo.
xiii
 Without being able to 
offer the possibility of facilitating membership – or perhaps more correctly, having 
lost its ability to block that path – Britain’s leverage would all but evaporate. 
 
 
Managing Illegal Migration and Other Issues 
 
As well as the concerns over the ongoing post-conflict stabilisation of the region, 
there are a range of other issues in the region that give cause for concern. Once again, 
Britain’s place in the EU, and its consequent ability to shape the further expansion of 
the Union, is understood to be an invaluable asset by policy makers. As the December 
2014 Balance of Competences Report on EU Enlargement noted,
 xiv
 
 
The [British] Government also believes that enlargement provides the UK 
with powerful levers to drive change in aspirant countries. On issues of 
concern to the UK, such as the rule of law and tackling organised crime, 
corruption and illegal migration, the enlargement process provides – through 
conditionality and assistance programmes – effective tools to encourage co-
operation and progress. 
 
Perhaps the most high profile of these ‘issues of concern’ at the moment is the 
question of illegal migration. This is an area that involves the Balkans in two distinct 
ways. In the first instance, there is the question of attempts by the inhabitants of the 
Western Balkan states to enter the EU. This particular issue came to widespread 
international attention in early 2015, when over 50,000 people left Kosovo and made 
their way through Serbia to the Hungarian border and the European Union.
xv
 
Secondly, and more recently, we have witnessed the images of refugees fleeing the 
war in Syria and making their way up from Greece, through Macedonia and Serbia on 
their way to Northern and Western Europe.
xvi
 Both of these waves of migration have 
received considerable attention in Britain and served to further strengthen Eurosceptic 
calls for the UK to leave the EU and, in doing so, ‘take back its borders’. 
 
However, in both cases, it is hard to see how Britain’s borders would in fact be 
strengthened by exiting the EU. Regarding mass migration from Kosovo, although the 
numbers were significant the problem was quickly addressed. The European Union, 
and Germany in particular,
xvii
 made it clear that any applications for asylum by 
anyone from Kosovo would be rejected and that the claimants would summarily be 
deported back. The message soon got through. Almost overnight, the problem eased 
dramatically. But even at its height, it posed no significant challenge to Britain. Few if 
any wanted to make their way to the UK, where the community of people born in 
Kosovo is a mere 28,000.
xviii
 Instead, the main target destination was Germany,
xix
 
where the Kosovo born population is estimated to be 200,000-300,000.
xx
 As for 
stemming the number of refugees from Syria making their way through the Western 
Balkans, the simple fact is that Britain’s decision to leave the EU would make almost 
no difference. The UK already has massive control over its borders by virtue of the 
fact that it is not a part of Schengen. Given that leaving the EU will not mean the end 
of the Schengen area, people will still be able to make it through a borderless Europe 
to Calais. Rather, leaving the EU will simply remove incentives for EU partners to 
cooperate with the UK on the issue of migration.
xxi
 
 
Then there are the other issues in the Western Balkans that touch upon the UK in one 
way or another, such as corruption, organised crime and growing religious 
radicalisation in the region. In the latter case, there are real concerns at the numbers 
from Kosovo and Bosnia,
xxii
 in particular, who are going to fight, mainly with ISIS, in 
Syria.
xxiii
 The implications of this are likely to be felt in many ways, not least of all in 
terms of the danger returning fighters pose to the internal stability of the countries. On 
all these issues, co-operation with EU partners through the pooling of intelligence is 
vital is vital if these issues are to be tackled effectively. So too is the influence that the 
UK can bring to bear on state authorities by virtue of its EU membership. Meanwhile, 
other new challenges are emerging. For instance, there are growing concerns about 
increasing Russian influence in the region. In the view of many observers, the best 
defence against this is to offer the Western Balkans a clear roadmap towards EU 
accession.
xxiv
 Needless to say, Britain would not be in a position to press the agenda 
from outside of the Union. Indeed, all things considered, it is hard to see how a 
decision to exit the EU could in any way enhance Britain’s ability to influence 
regional policies and debates on any of these matters. Even if one was to take a very 
sceptical view, the very best one could say is that Brexit would be ‘influence neutral’. 
 
Of course, the counter argument is that continued membership also carries a price in 
the Western Balkans context. It would mean an increase in the number of new arrivals 
from these states under the freedom of movement. This position has gained significant 
traction in public and political debate over the past few years. The demographic 
effects of further enlargement have been noted in negative terms by politicians from 
across the political spectrum.
xxv
  However, such concerns are overplayed. For a start, 
the numbers of people potentially able to move to Britain will be very small relative 
to previous rounds of enlargement. The entire population of the six Western Balkan 
states queuing to join the EU is approximately 17 million. Compare this to the 30 
million inhabitants of Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007 and gained full 
access to Britain in 2014. In other words, the period of enlargement leading to major 
demographic changes is now over. Moreover, the pull factor is minimal.xxvi  The 
Balkans community in Britain is tiny. In the 2011 census, the entire population of 
people born in Albania was 13,000. Meanwhile, those born in the rest of the Western 
Balkans – Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia – amounted to 
approximately 25,000.
xxvii
 Compare this to the 579,000 from Poland, 274,000 from 
Germany, and even 177,000 from the United States. Finally, while the actual numbers 
coming to the UK are likely to be small, there will be the possibility of transitional 
restrictions. For all these reasons, one has to ask whether the ‘benefits’ to the UK of 
preventing freedom of movement from the Western Balkans are really offset by the 
costs that would come in terms of limiting British influence in other areas. 
 
Indeed, this is already being seen. The mere debate in Britain over its relationship 
with the EU, especially as it is linked with freedom of movement, is already starting 
to have a negative effect on the UK’s standing and influence in the Western Balkans. 
Speaking with officials from the region, it is already more than obvious that Britain is 
no longer seen as the champion of enlargement that it once was.
xxviii
 While the 
Foreign Office remains a strong proponent of enlargement, xxix  and British officials in 
the region go to great lengths to emphasise Britain’s commitment to further EU 
expansion,xxx this is simply not mirrored by British politicians, who now rarely if ever 
speak out in favour of enlargement. In contrast, Germany’s influence in the region has 
soared. So much so, that it is now seen as a far more important centre of power than 
Brussels for Balkan states seeking to join the European Union.
xxxi
 
 
 
Alternative Forms of Influence 
 
Of course, there are those who would argue that any UK decision to leave the EU 
would to a degree be mitigated by other factors. One obvious example is its continued 
membership of NATO. In part this is true. It does give Britain a certain degree of 
influence. However, across the range of areas surveyed here, it is clear that NATO 
would not provide a truly meaningful alternative to the EU as a mechanism for 
exerting leverage over the region. This is for several reasons. Perhaps most 
importantly, NATO focuses on security, whereas the European Union covers a broad 
range of social, political and economic fields. Consequently, there is simply not the 
degree of conditionality required for NATO as there is for the EU.
xxxii
 While Britain 
would retain some significance in very specific areas, its ability to shape the wider 
situation would be limited. Crucially, this reduction in influence would be most 
keenly felt in the case of Serbia, where there is little obvious desire for NATO 
membership.
xxxiii
 Working solely within the confines of NATO, Britain would lose its 
leverage over Belgrade on Bosnia and Kosovo. For these reasons, while continued 
British membership of NATO would certainly provide a useful mechanism for 
continued engagement with many of the countries of the Western Balkans, it could 
not replace the influence the UK derives from its membership of the EU. 
 Another potential area of continued influence is the United Kingdom’s permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council. Although this gives Britain a degree of 
influence to shape the agenda, its effects would be dramatically diminished if the UK 
were to leave the European Union. Even now, its significance is rather questionable. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence for this comes from the recent British effort to introduce 
a Security Council resolution commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the 
genocide at Srebrenica. Although Britain pushed hard for this, the text proved 
unacceptable to Serbia. In the end, and following a request from Belgrade,
xxxiv
 Russia 
vetoed what it termed a ‘politically motivated’ resolution.xxxv As a result, relations 
between Britain and Serbia suffered a significant setback.
xxxvi
 Not only that, the 
essentially pro-Western Serbian Government was left in the position of owing 
Moscow yet another favour (after Russia’s veto of efforts to pass a Security Council 
resolution granting Kosovo independence, in 2007). Even with its membership of the 
EU, and the leverage that one would have expected that this would have provided, the 
UK was not able to secure Serbia’s support for the resolution. It seems unlikely that 
the outcome would have been any different if Britain had not been in the EU. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For Britain, the Western Balkans remains primarily a security challenge. As a recent 
British government report put it, ‘For the western Balkans, the evidence suggested that, 
although the economic benefits to the UK and EU of further enlargement will probably be 
modest, the benefits in terms of Europe’s security and stability are compelling.’xxxvii 
However, it is also now more than apparent that the single most important factor 
shaping the security environment in the region is the prospect of EU accession. To 
this extent, it seems increasingly clear that if the UK wishes to remain a significant 
actor in the region, it is likely to be unable to do so outside of the context of the 
European Union. This is particularly obvious in the case of Serbia and Kosovo. The 
success of the EU-dialogue has been the result of the UK working with its EU 
partners (most notably Germany) to influence and pressure on the sides. However, 
none of this would have been possible without the lure of accession. Likewise, while 
Bosnia remains highly dysfunctional, the only realistic hope that things will improve 
rests in the country’s wish to pursue EU membership. Here again, the UK has been at 
the forefront of efforts to stabilise the country and find a constructive way past the 
current constitutional impasse. In both cases, it is hard to see how Britain could hope 
to exert a leading role without being a highly influential member of the European 
Union. Of course, Britain could still be part of such initiatives outside of the Union. 
However, its ability to shape the debate in a fundamental way would be diminished. 
 
As for other ‘issues of concern’, Brexit seems to offer no distinct advantages. In the 
case of migration from and through the Western Balkans, Britain’s decision to leave 
the European Union would have next to no real beneficial effect. Actual and potential 
migrants from the region have shown little real interest in the UK and seem unlikely 
to do so in the future. As for stemming the flow of migrants and refugees from 
elsewhere, this is an issue that requires cooperation between EU partners, rather than 
exerting leverage over the states of South East Europe. Certainly, Britain would not 
find its ability to protect its borders strengthened by a departure from the EU. 
Meanwhile, the UK’s ability to work with the its current EU partners and the 
countries of the region on other questions – such as corruption, organised crime and 
the flow of fighters to Syria – would be diminished.  
 
Of course, this is not to say that Britain’s influence would disappear altogether in the 
event that it does decide to leave the European Union. It is clear that it will still retain 
pockets of leverage. Its place in NATO will give it a little significance, even if its 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council would seem unlikely to do so. 
However, where it really matters, it will no longer be seen as a key actor. Indeed, 
already, we are starting to see a waning of its influence. 
 
The British Government has already acknowledged that what happens in the Balkans 
has an effect on the country. This will remain the case regardless of whether the 
country remains a member of the European Union or not. However, if the United 
Kingdom does decide to leave the European Union, it must expect that its ability to 
shape and manage developments in the Western Balkans will be radically curtailed. 
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